2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by the Republic of Korea

As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", the Conference agreed upon the submission of regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Pursuant to this decision, the Republic of Korea hereby submits its updated report to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The present report follows the first and second reports of the Republic of Korea to the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, submitted in 2003 and 2004 respectively.

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Under current circumstances, in which cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and its safeguards systems and the emergence of a clandestine international network for the procurement of nuclear materials and technology have undermined the integrity and credibility of the Treaty, and in light of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism amid the recent increase in terrorist activities around the world, the need to fortify and preserve the efficacy and integrity of the Treaty has become more crucial than ever.

2. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Republic of Korea continues to abide by its commitment, pursuant to the Treaty, not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked a significant achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament. The guidelines laid out in the Final Document serve not only as a measuring stick to gauge progress in this field, but

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also as a road map for achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Since the adoption of the Final Document in 2000, expectations have been ever-increasing for progress on the implementation of disarmament and transparency measures on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The five nuclear-weapon States should put their unequivocal commitment to disarmament into action by making systematic and progressive efforts. However, it should also be recognized that nuclear disarmament is a dynamic and complex process that is inextricably connected to the international security environment.

4. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the achievement of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Republic of Korea signed the Treaty when it opened for signature on 24 September 1996 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 24 September 1999. The Republic of Korea continues to encourage other States to ratify this Treaty, particularly those States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force at the earliest possible date. In an effort to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty, the Republic of Korea has served as a friend of the Chair for the facilitation of the Treaty's early entry into force. It is our firm belief that existing moratoriums on nuclear testing by all countries must be maintained, while sustained support is being accorded to the early establishment of the effective monitoring mechanism of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In this regard, the Republic of Korea is actively participating in the development of the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, particularly through the cooperation of its seismological monitoring station, one of the primary stations in the North-East Asian region.

5. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is regrettable that the Conference has not yet been able to break the impasse that has kept it from beginning substantive work. As a next logical step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is imperative for the Conference to begin negotiations immediately on a universal and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

6. The Republic of Korea fully supports the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a competent authority responsible for the verification and assurance of compliance with NPT obligations. The Republic of Korea continues to urge those States which have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. To strengthen the Agency's effectiveness in verifying compliance and detecting actions of non-compliance, it is important to promote the universality of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. For its part, the Republic of Korea notified IAEA on 19 February 2004 of the completion of its internal procedure for the ratification of the Additional Protocol. As a result, the Republic of Korea has become the thirty-ninth country to bring the Protocol into force. Pursuant to the Additional Protocol, the Republic of Korea submitted its initial declarations to the IAEA Director General on 17 August 2004.

7. The Republic of Korea welcomes progress on the development and implementation of nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Republic of Korea lent its support to resolutions establishing or consolidating nuclear-weapon-free zones. Furthermore, the Republic

of Korea continues to uphold its commitments to the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula adopted in 1992.

8. The Republic of Korea welcomes the entry into force in June 2003 of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty). It is expected that such progress in bilateral nuclear reductions agreements will facilitate similar disarmament initiatives in the future.

9. The Republic of Korea joined in the Group of Eight Global Partnership in 2004 to support international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The Republic of Korea allocated US$ 500,000 for Global Partnership projects for 2005 and another US$ 710,000 for the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow for 2004-2005.

10. The Republic of Korea recognizes that strengthening relevant export control regimes is a useful step towards the effective prevention of nuclear proliferation. These mechanisms should continue to be strengthened. As of 1 January 2003, the Government of the Republic of Korea introduced the catch-all system into its legal framework and has been implementing it accordingly. The Republic of Korea also made every effort to strengthen the nuclear export control regime during its chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group from May 2003 to May 2004 and since then has actively participated in activities of the Group's Troika to contribute to that end.

11. The Republic of Korea supports Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to deal with the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Pursuant to the resolution, the Republic of Korea submitted its first implementation report on 27 October 2004.

12. The Republic of Korea also attaches great importance to the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of preventing the spread of missiles and related technologies that can be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The Republic of Korea joined the Regime in March 2001 and has held its chairmanship since October 2004, when the 19th plenary meeting of the Regime was held in the Republic of Korea.

13. In December 2004, in cooperation with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the Republic of Korea hosted its third annual Jeju Process on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. The theme for 2004 was "How to address challenges in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation today".

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Lithuania

Article I

1. Lithuania views the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. An effective implementation of article I by nuclear-weapon States plays an essential role to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article II

2. Lithuania abides by its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. Non-proliferation efforts are guided by the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of December 2003.

3. Furthering its commitment to sound export controls and prevention of proliferation in all its aspects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Lithuania joined all major export control regimes, namely, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is pending a decision by MTCR members. Before membership in EU, Lithuania passed a new Law on the Control of Strategic Goods on 1 May 2004, which now includes provisions on brokering, transfer of intangible items, and the like.

4. With the assistance of IAEA and other organizations, Lithuania has taken the necessary measures to improve the national physical protection system of radioactive materials. Improvements in the physical protection system of high-activity sealed radioactive sources in five Lithuanian personal health-care institutions of an oncological profile have been made.

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5. The physical protection system in the Maišiagala nuclear waste repository was modernized. The Maišiagala repository, since 1963 operated by the Soviet military, was closed in 1988, but high-risk radioactive sources, including caesium, still remain buried at the site. An account of the buried materials has been maintained since 1973, yet information for 10 preceding years is missing. A modern monitoring and diversion detection system has been installed at the site.

6. In 2004, with the assistance of the United States of America, an investigation of orphan sources was conducted in those former industrial and military enterprises of the Soviet Union that used radioactive sources in their operations.

7. With a view to implementing the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, appropriate changes were made in the legislative framework which regulates the requirements for the physical protection and safety of such sources.

8. Additional measures were taken to secure contaminated beryllium at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and radiation detection capabilities were enhanced.

9. Since the accession of Lithuania to EU, the accounting and control of nuclear materials has been regulated by the European Commission's Regulation on the Application of European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Safeguards. Lithuania is subject to IAEA and EURATOM safeguards. The role of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials is carried out by the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). The system of accounting of nuclear materials is maintained and nuclear inventory change reports are submitted to IAEA and the European Commission.

10. All sources of ionizing radiation and radioactive substances imported and stored in Lithuania as well as exported from Lithuania are recorded on the accounting system that is maintained by the Radiation Protection Centre. Information is collected, accumulated, systemized and analysed in the State Register of Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers.

Article III

11. Lithuania seeks to implement the EU Common Position on the universalization of the main multilateral non-proliferation agreements, adopted in November 2003 and supports universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and recognizes that, together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol is now the verification standard under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. Lithuania has been implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol for four years now and IAEA noted in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2003 that the Agency found no indication of diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

13. After Lithuania became a member of the European Union in May 2004, a transition from a bilateral safeguards agreement with IAEA and its Additional Protocol to the trilateral ones between the EU non-nuclear-weapon States, EURATOM and IAEA was required. Implementation of an integrated safeguards approach should soon follow in Lithuania.

14. Since Lithuania's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004, the inspections under the EURATOM safeguards have been carried out by European Commission inspectors.

Article IV

15. Under the commitment undertaken by Lithuania in the process of accession to the European Union, on 31 December 2004 Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP was shut down. The decommissioning programme has been set.

16. The spent fuel has been stored on the Ignalina NPP site since the start of operation of the Nuclear Power Plant. No reprocessing or export of spent fuel has ever taken place. The dry storage casks for spent fuel outside Ignalina NPP were commissioned in 1999, but have been almost filled in. A new state-of-the-art dry storage facility is being designed for 50 years of operation. It will provide adequate containment and radiation shielding of fuel assemblies removed from both units of Ignalina NPP.

Article V

17. Lithuania ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in February 2000 and undertook all necessary measures to implement its provisions at the national level. Lithuania considers the Treaty an essential instrument in the global architecture of the nuclear disarmament process.

Article VI

18. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons as affirmed in the Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences has been Lithuania's objective. Lithuania is convinced that accountability, transparency, irreversibility and confidence-building are fundamental principles that constitute an indispensable framework within which to further the implementation of article VI.

19. Commitments, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, need to be followed through. Lithuania believes that the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons, among others, should be addressed as a matter of priority. Verifiable reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. It is important to fulfil the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and report regularly on their implementation.

20. A fissile material cut-off Treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lithuania calls upon the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

21. Lithuania supported the Proliferation Security Initiative, which proved to be an effective means to tackle illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in accordance with national legislation and the respective provisions of international law.

22. Lithuania supports Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), calling for effective measures by all States to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear

weapons. Lithuania submitted its report under that resolution in 2004 (S/AC.44/2004/(02)/26).

Article VII

23. While not a member itself of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Lithuania welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and the Disarmament Commission guidelines.

Article VIII

24. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 included a commitment to a strengthened Treaty review process. Regular reporting on implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proved to be enhancing the performance of and the accountability under the Treaty.

Article IX

25. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a core objective. Lithuania deplored the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty and continued to urge it to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, including its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA.

Article X

26. Lithuania believes it is important that States should not be able to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and then continue to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technologies or facilities acquired while they remained Parties to the Treaty.